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1 Introduction1
Most cities have distressed neighborhoods where jobs are few and unemployment is rampant. As
a response, considering that the lack of labor demand in poor areas is a key contributor to un-
employment, a number of countries including the US, the UK and Francehave implemented
spatially targeted policies to encourage job creation or job relocation to these areas. Such poli-
cies often labelled enterprise zone programs (EZ hereafter)revolve around the simple idea that
granting scal incentives to rms located in distressed neighborhoods would boost local hires. Al-
though intuitively appealing, enterprise zones are controversial as many observers have questioned
their ability to reach their objectives and whether achieved benets are su¢ cient to balance costs
(Peters and Fishers, 2004).
The goal of the present paper is to provide an econometric evaluation of the French experience
in this domain, focusing on the Paris region for which there exists a dataset that allows an adequate
evaluation of the policy at the municipality level. The key measure in the French program is that,
in order to be exempted from the wage tax, rms needed to hire at least 20% of their labor force
locally (after the third hired worker). In the French context, this is a signicant incentive as the
wage tax exemption is larger than a third of all labor costs borne by employers depending on the
wage level and type of worker. The policy was expected to improve local employment through
hires made by existing, relocating, or newly-created rms that would draw from the local pool of
unemployed workers.
Our approach for the impact evaluation of the program is original in various ways.
1The authors are grateful to participants at the following conferences and seminars: NARSC 08, EALE 09,
ESEM 09, and London School of Economics, for their helpful comments, and particularly to Shawn Rohlin, Je¤rey
Zax and Roland Rathelot. They would also like to thank the French Ministry of Health (MiRe-DREES) and the
French Ministry of Labor (DARES) for nancial support. The opinions expressed in this article are those of the
authors and do not necessarily reect the views of our employers, including the World Bank, its Executive Board,
or the countries represented. All remaining errors are ours.
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First, we depart from the approach used in previous papers in the literature as we investigate
the propensity of local unemployed workers to nd a job. In the past, evaluations of enterprise
zones usually focused on the growth in the local number of establishments or on the number of
local jobs that were created as a result of the policy. Nonetheless, using job creation as a measure
of policy outcome misses part of the story as it is usually impossible to tell whether job creations
benet local residents or residents from non-targeted areas. Instead, in the present paper, we
investigate how the policy a¤ects the ow out of unemployment, distinguishing between locations.
This is a more appropriate indicator of policy success given the explicit policy goal of helping
unemployed workers residing in distressed areas nd jobs.
Second, focusing on unemployment duration has the advantage of capturing the overall local
e¤ect of job creations on the propensity to nd a job. Indeed, policy evaluations that focus exclu-
sively on job creations in new establishments are likely to provide a biased estimate of the e¤ect
by overlooking the fact that jobs may also be created in existing rms or that there could be some
substitution of jobs between existing rms and new establishments. Focusing on unemployment
duration eliminates these problems.
Third, we propose a new econometric methodology that allows for a ne estimation of the pol-
icys local e¤ects while controlling for the composition of the sample in each location, thus avoiding
composition bias in the estimation. We use a two-stage procedure, which revolves around the esti-
mation of a proportional hazard model of individual unemployment durations which is stratied by
municipality and which controls for individual characteristics. In the rst stage, we use the Strat-
ied Partial Likelihood Estimator (SPLE) proposed by Ridder and Tunali (1999) and compute
spatial e¤ects for each of the 1,300 municipalities that form the Paris region. These municipality
e¤ects are purged of the e¤ects of individual observed characteristics for each semester between
1993 and 2003 and capture all municipality characteristics that have an impact on unemployment
duration. Right censoring that a¤ects unemployment durations is also controlled for. In a second
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stage, in order to assess the e¤ect of the policy, we measure how these municipality e¤ects changed
over time (before and after the creation of enterprise zones) comparing municipalities that host an
enterprise zone the "treated" municipalitiesand other municipalities of comparable characteris-
tics. This second stage uses matching and di¤erences in di¤erences techniques to address possible
issues of treatment selectivity.
Fourth, we use a large number of localities (i.e. 1,300) for the stratication in the estimation
of the unemployment duration model. A municipality corresponds to the nest spatial unit of
analysis that is available in the data. Since municipalities have a population size which is broadly
twice that of the enterprise zone they contain, this means that we capture net e¤ects in the EZ
and non-EZ parts of a same municipality only. Since municipalities are relatively small, however,
we are able to investigate the possibility of spatial spillovers on neighboring municipalities.
Finally, our work complements the only existing econometric study of enterprise zone programs
in France, which found only a limited impact on the growth in the number of establishments (see
Rathelot and Sillard, 2009).
Our core approach to estimate the e¤ect of the policy contrasts exit rates from unemployment
between municipalities which are selected for the policy and municipalities in a comparison group
around the date of implementation of the policy. Several methods were at our disposal in the
toolkit of evaluation methods (see Blundell and Costa-Dias, 2009, for a recent survey). Because
the sample we are considering is small, we resort to a linear model rather using non-parametric
methods. Second, in the absence of a controlled experiment, the key was the construction of
the comparison, or control group, in a very careful way (Smith and Todd, 2005). In the French
experience, zone designation was based on a criterion that included measures of population and
labor force composition. Political tampering implied that the municipalities that were not targeted
by the program but have characteristics similar to those of treated municipalities can be used as
a control group. To match municipalities, we started by estimating the propensity score i.e. the
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probability of being chosen as an enterprise zone municipality as a function of the same variables
that were o¢ cially used to construct an eligibility criterion in the French enterprise zone program.
Based on this propensity score, we then constructed a control group of municipalities whose
propensity score is in the same range as that of treated municipalities, ensuring that municipalities
in both groups share the same conditions. However, the data clearly tell that the set of variables
included in the eligibility criterion is not rich enough to account for the heterogeneity in outcomes
between treated and control municipalities (Smith and Todd, 2005). Conditioning on municipality
geographic conditions was thus also necessary. This is why we ended up using a di¤erence in
di¤erences approach combined with matching on a propensity score (Heckman, Ichimura and
Todd, 1997). The results of our empirical strategy prove to be robust to a variety of appropriate
robustness checks relative to redenitions of treatment and control so as to capture spillover e¤ects,
to various weighting schemes or to the introduction of other controlling factors.
Our results point to three important conclusions for public policy. First, we nd evidence
that the policy tended to "pick winners", that is to select municipalities in which unemployed
workers face better prospects, a common feature in many EZ programs. More importantly, we
nd that enterprise zones have a moderate (3%) but signicant impact on unemployment exit
rates to employment in the short run (at most 3 years). We do not nd evidence of medium run
e¤ects (between 3 and 6 years) although this could potentially be attributed to the failure of the
common trend assumption underlying di¤erence-in-di¤erence estimation. Finally, the e¤ect on
unemployment exits remains localized and no spillover e¤ects are signicant.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Following this introduction, we provide a survey of the
literature on enterprise zones in a second section. We present the French enterprise zone program
in a third section. We then describe our data in a fourth section. A fth section explains our
estimation strategy, while a sixth section discusses the results of the policy evaluation. A seventh
section concludes and o¤ers a policy discussion.
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2 Enterprise zones: a survey of the literature
Enterprise zones (EZ) programs are territorial discrimination policies that consist in providing tax
incentives and exemptions from regulations to specic blighted areas. The objective is to promote
local economic development and, in particular, to improve the level of local employment through
incentives for rms to invest, hire, locate or relocate to the targeted areas. The concept, which
was initially inspired by the rapid development of free trade zones in the early 1970s in emerging
economies, was rst used as a tool for urban policy by the United Kingdom in 1981. In the wake
of the UK initiative, several US states also enacted similar legislations, starting with Connecticut.
Furthermore, a US federal program of empowerment zones was implemented in several cities in
1994. It provided not only tax incentives to the rms but also important social service block
grantsi.e. lump sum transfers from the federal government to States that are spent on targeted
areas. Following these experiences, France voted its rst EZ program in 1996.
A comparison of existing EZ programs shows that the specic scal tools that are used vary
widely from di¤erent forms of relief on capital taxation to employment and hiring tax credits, or a
combination of both. The specic tools may also vary depending on the zone designation process,
the conditionality for tax credit eligibility, the intensity and scope of the tax credits, the duration
and phasing out of the exemptions, the time frame of the program, the spatial coverage and the
number of zones, the requirement to simultaneously implement a local urban development plan,
or whether foregone local tax revenues are partially or completely compensated by the State.
In theory, enterprise zone programs are expected to contribute to local economic development
through several mechanisms depending on the specic features of the program and the context. In
what follows, we will focus on whether they can succeed in promoting employment. The e¤ect of
capital subsidies is ambiguous. Although capital subsidies (like e.g. credit on local property tax,
or tax credit on inventories) should encourage investments, this could happen at the expense of
employment if capital and labor are substitutes in production (Lynch and Zax, 2008). In the case
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of factor complementarity, however, capital subsidies could be expected to have a positive e¤ect
also on employment. As for labor subsidies (like e.g. relief on wage taxes), they should have an
unambiguous e¤ect on employment by strengthening the incentives to hire workers. Income tax
rebates should encourage both hiring and investments.
Despite the mechanisms just described, several criticisms grounded in economic theory have
been formulated. A rst issue is that scal incentives may only turn out to provide windfall
e¤ects to rms who would have hired workers in any case, with little impact on the local level
of employment. But then, conditioning the tax credits on local hiring as it is often the case
in enterprise zone programs should address this problem and improve employment, at least in
targeted areas. Another related issue is that enterprise zones may not necessarily result in job
creation but could cause geographical shifts in jobs from non-EZ to EZ areas. However, even if
it turns out to be the case, it is not clear whether this should be considered a failure of the
policy as it can be socially desirable to spatially redistribute jobs to places of low employment,
even in the case of a zero-sum game. A third argument is that zone designation may result in
the stigmatisation of the targeted neighborhood, further exacerbating the redlining behavior of
employers. The issue is then whether the adverse indirect e¤ect of stigmatisation outweighs the
expected direct benecial impact on employment. A fourth objection stresses that in the absence of
tax revenue compensation, enterprise zone programs may lead to a decrease in the local provision
of public services, which in turn could have a detrimental e¤ect on employment and in any
case on the welfare of the local population. Of course, this depends on the way the EZ program
and infrastructures are funded. The problem can be addressed by ensuring that the enterprise
zone legislation provides appropriate mechanisms for compensation or can be avoided altogether
if the burden of the tax cuts is directly borne by the State and not by the local government.
Moreover, a fth criticism argues that the e¤ects of enterprise zones could be only transitory and
will cease with the phasing out of the exemptions. As a matter of fact, in many cases, exemptions
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have been extended passed the initial deadline although this may involve the perpetuation of a
costly policy. Lastly, it can be argued that providing only scal incentives could be insu¢ cient to
improve local employment when unemployment is structural as is the case for instance when there
is a mismatch between unemployed workersskills and job requirements. This argues in favor of
integrated policies beyond the sole stimulation of labor demand.
In view of these arguments, whether enterprise zones successfully manage to improve employ-
ment may strongly depend on the specicity of each program and on the local context. This clearly
makes the evaluation of EZ programs a key empirical matter for policy makers and explains the
relatively abundant literature on the topic (see Ladd, 1994, Peters and Fisher, 2004, and Hira-
suna and Michael, 2005, for surveys). It is only in the mid 1990s however that proper evaluations
started to emerge, resorting to a variety of statistical techniques and focusing on a variety of labor-
market indicators.2 The main usual challenge in such evaluations is to address selection issues.
Areas are often selected according to a ranking using some economic indicator as well as on possi-
ble political tampering from local government representatives seeking benet from the policy for
their constituencies. Addressing this issue thus requires resorting to quasi-experimental techniques
using panel data to control for local heterogeneity. Identication strategies typically range from
random growth models to di¤erence in di¤erences, possibly using propensity score matching to
dene adequate control groups or propensity score reweighting to construct some counterfactuals.
In the US, the econometric evaluations of state EZ programs reported in the economic literature
provide mixed results. To our knowledge, the rst such study is Papke (1994) who evaluates the
e¤ect of the 1983 Indiana enterprise zone program, which consisted in providing credits to rms on
the local property and inventory tax as well as in granting residents an income tax deduction in
a selection of areas in central cities. The authors main nding is that annual local unemployment
2Many past evaluations undertaken before the mid 1990s, did not apply the now-standard techniques of public
policy evaluation. In some cases, evaluations were not carried out by parties external to the program. This resulted
in a controversial literature with sometimes unclear and contradictory results.
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claims declined by a surprisingly high 19% following zone designation. Given the modesty of
employment incentives in the program, the author suggests that this result may reect some
"demonstration e¤ect" as was indeed described by zone administrators. Elvery (2009) studies the
EZ programs in California and Florida and nds no evidence that enterprise zones have a¤ected
the individual probability of employment for zone residents. Focusing on the 1984 New Jersey
program, Boarnet and Bogart (1996) look at the number of job creations in municipalities with
an enterprise zone. As they do not nd any e¤ect, they speculate that this could be due to a shift
in jobs from non-EZ to EZ areas within the concerned municipalities.
These contrasting results raise the issue that some enterprise zone policies may be more successful
than others. This is tested by Bondonio and Engberg (2000) who assess the e¤ect of enterprise zone
programs in ve di¤erent states3 on local employment at the ZIP-code level while also controlling
for the monetary value of the incentives. They nd very little impact on the di¤erence between non-
EZ and EZ employment growth. Like Boarnet and Bogart, they suspect that this weak aggregate
e¤ect could be due to job transfers from non-EZ to EZ areas within the same ZIP-code area and
from old to new rms within the same ZIP-code area. The latter argument is consistent with
the idea that start-ups could drive away existing businesses during the implementation of the
program.
To further estimate the dynamics at work beyond the average impact estimated in previous studies,
Bondonio and Greenbaum (2007) focus on the e¤ects of enterprise zone programs in ten states4 and
Washington, DC. Their approach consists in separately evaluating the e¤ects of the EZ program
on new, existing and vanishing establishments. Consistently with Bondonio and Engberg (2000)s
intuition, they nd that enterprise zone programs increase employment in new establishments
but that this is o¤set by the accelerated loss of employment in vanishing establishments. They
3California, Kentucky, New York, Pennsylvania and Virginia.
4California, Connecticut, Florida, Indiana, Kentucky, Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, and
Virginia.
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are also able to identify which features of the programs have greater positive impacts on existing
businesses, stressing the role of incentives tied to job creation and of strategic local development
plans.
OKeefe (2004) investigates two other issues concerning enterprise zone programs: whether possible
e¤ects on employment are transitory or permanent, and whether wage tax credits are captured
by higher wages. Using annual establishment-level employment data at the census tract level
between 1992 and 1999 in California where the enterprise zone program provides hiring credit
for low wages to be phased out after six years she nds that employment in targeted zones grew
3.1 percent faster the rst six years after designation than it would have in the absence of the
program. But the e¤ect is only transitory. She suggests that the waning of the e¤ect could be
explained by the phasing out of the hiring incentive, and also by the reduced availability of vacant
properties for businesses and rms in the zone as the years pass. As for wages, they do not seem to
be a¤ected by the enterprise zone program. Nonetheless, these ndings on the California program
have been challenged by other studies. The results on employment are contradicted by Neumark
and Kolko (2010) who use the precise street boundaries of enterprise zones and check whether
establishments are located within these boundaries over the 1992-2004 period. They nd that
the e¤ect of enterprise zones on employment is insignicant both in the short and the long run.
OKeefes results on wages are also contradicted by Bostic and Prohofsky (2006) who show, using
administrative scal data, that the income of enterprise zone participants in California increased
more rapidly than for controls.
Since 1994, a federal "empowerment zone" program has complemented the enterprise zone
policies that were initiated by states. This program created empowerment zones in six urban
communities5 where local rms were granted substantial tax credits for each employee living and
working in the concerned areas. Empowerment zones also became eligible for important block grant
5Atlanta, Baltimore, Chicago, Detroit, New York City, and Philadelphia/Camden.
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funds from the federal government which could be used for social purposes. Other policy measures
included grants meant to facilitate large-scale physical development projects, tax-exempt bonds to
businesses, and write-o¤s from taxes (see Busso and Kline, 2008 for more details). Evaluations of
the e¤ects of the federal program on labour market performances are reported in several studies. In
particular, Busso and Kline (2008) compare census tracts in designated zones with tracts including
rejected zones or which ended up designated only at a later date. They nd that EZ programs had
a positive e¤ect on local employment and a negative e¤ect on the local poverty rate. Their results
on employment and poverty are debated by Hanson (2009) who argues that EZ designation might
have been endogenous. When instrumenting EZ designation by political variables, he nds that
EZ programs had no e¤ect on employment and poverty.
3 Enterprise zones in France
France launched its rst enterprise zone program on January 1, 1997 by creating 44 enterprise zones
(Zones Franches Urbaines in French), among which 38 are located in metropolitan France, and 9
in the Paris region.6 Enterprise zones are the smallest level of a nested three-tier zoning system of
distressed areas around which France organizes its urban policy interventions. While the rst and
second tier (the Zones Urbaines Sensibles and Zones de Redynamisation Urbaine respectively) are
mostly the focus of social programs and urban revitalization projects, the third tier which groups
areas that are most distressed was only dened for the specic implementation of the French EZ
program (see Observatoire National des Zones Urbaines Sensibles, 2004, for more details). Since
6The 9 targeted neighborhoods in the Paris region are located within or across 13 municipalities. The list is as
follows: Beauval / La Pierre Collinet (in the municipality of Meaux), Zup de Surville (in Montereau-Fault-Yonne),
Le Val Fourré (in Mantes-la-Jolie), Cinq Quartiers (in Les Mureaux), La Grande Borne (in Grigny and Viry-
Châtillon), Quartier Nord (in Bondy), Grand Ensemble (in Clichy-sous-Bois and Montfermeil), Le Bois LAbbé /
Les Mordacs (in Champigny-sur-Marne and Chennevières-sur-Marne), Dame Blanche Nord-Ouest / La Muette /
Les Doucettes (in Garges-lès-Gonesse and Sarcelles).
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the number and intensity of scal exemptions is gradually increased when comparing the rst,
the second, and the third tiers of urban interventions, EZs benet from the complete set of scal
incentives.
As is well known in France, the selection of enterprise zones was clearly not random. Municipal-
ities or groups of municipalities had to apply to the program and projects were selected according
to their ranking given by a synthetic indicator. This indicator aggregates 5 criteria based on the
population of the zone, its unemployment rate, the proportion of youngsters, the proportion of
workers with no skill, and the so-called scal potentialof the municipality or municipalities in
which the zone is located.7 Nevertheless, the views of local and centralized government represen-
tatives who intervened in the geographic delimitation of the zones were also taken into account.
After application of the criteria and consideration of local interests, enterprise zones ended up be-
ing large neighborhoods of at least 10,000 inhabitants that had particularly severe unemployment
problems.
Figures from the 1999 Census of the Population (the closest year to the designation date) indicate
that 730,000 people, around 1.25% of the French population at that time, resided in these zones.
The nine enterprise zones in the Paris region hosted almost 220,000 inhabitants, i.e. 2% of the
population of the region. They also accounted for a signicant portion of the population in the
municipalities where they are located (between 22 and 68%, and 45% on average).
The scal incentives were uniform across the country and consisted in a series of tax reliefs on
property holding, corporate income, and in particular wages (see DARES, 2004, for more details).8
7The scal potential is the ctive local amount of taxes that would be collected if tax rates were uniform
across all municipalities in France. The formula for the synthetic indicator is the product of the rst four criteria
divided by the fth (see DIV, Observatoire National des Zones Urbaines Sensibles, 2004).
8Exemptions concern the specic following taxes: charges sociales patronales (employerssocial security con-
tribution which constitutes the wage tax), taxe professionnelle (business rate), impôt sur les bénéces (prot
tax), taxe foncière (property tax), and cotisations sociales personnelles maladie et maternité (individual health
insurance contributions).
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The key measure was that rms needed to hire at least 20% of their labor force locally (after the
third worker hired) in order to be exempted from the wage tax (mainly employerscontribution to
national insurance). These exemptions were meant to be temporary and were more advantageous
for small rms (i.e. establishments with less than 5 salaried workers) which beneted from a
9-year rather than a 5-year exemption completed by a 3 year degressive exemption. The program
was meant to last until January 1, 2002, but exemptions were extended beyond that date. At that
time, they were also slightly modied and the local employment threshold was increased to 33%.
In 2004, 41 new enterprise zones were created. In 2006, an additional 15 were added to the list.
Surprisingly, no evaluation of the French enterprise zone program was initially planned. Al-
though some evaluationsbased on descriptive statistics were subsequently carried out by di¤er-
ent public authorities, they yielded opposite conclusions from no e¤ectto considerable e¤ects
(DIV, 2001, André, 2002). Whereas descriptive statistics suggested that enterprise zones a¤ected
the local dynamics of job and establishment creations, they depicted a potentially ambiguous e¤ect
on unemployment. Between 1997 and 2001, the ratio of establishment openings to the initial stock
of establishments has been estimated at 236% in enterprise zones, compared to 76% in the rest of
the metropolitan areas where EZs are located (Ernst, 2008). Note however that these gures are
gross establishment creations and do not take into account destructions. Interestingly, the 5-year
survival rates of establishments are quite similar in EZs and the rest of their metropolitan areas.
The increase in the number of establishments, however, may not fully percolate to an increase in
local employment because rms in enterprise zones are typically very small. It has been calculated
for instance that 50% of hired workers in EZs in 2002 were hired by rms of less than 10 salaried
workers, and that 15% of the rms in EZs had no salaried worker at all (Thélot, 2004). Although
not a statistical evaluation of the EZ program, Gilli (2006) reports that between 1997 and 2002,
the number of jobs in the 38 metropolitan enterprise zones grew from 27,000 to 72,000. Even
though the increase seems large in relative terms, it is less drastic when compared to the resident
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population. In fact, jobs remained scarce with respect to the size of the labor force. While there
were approximately 10 jobs for 100 labor force participants in EZs in 1997, the gure only increased
to 13 jobs for 100 labor force participants in 2003. Although an improvement, this remains rather
small. In addition, 22% of job creations in EZs are believed to have resulted from the relocations
of rm which may have brought some workers with them.
Although these gures are interesting per se, they do not constitute an assessment of the e¤ects of
the French enterprise zone program. To our knowledge, the only existing econometric evaluation
of enterprise zones is Rathelot and Sillard (2009) who focus on the e¤ect of enterprise zones on
establishment creation and salaried employment. Their identication strategy takes advantage of
the transformation of a number of community redevelopment areas (Zones de Redynamisation
Urbaines) into enterprise zones (Zones Franches Urbaines) in 2004 when the second wave of
enterprise zones was enacted. Using di¤erence in di¤erences techniques, they nd that enterprise
zones had only a modest e¤ect on establishment creation and salaried jobs (possibly 4,000 jobs
between 2004 and 2006 for the whole country).
Our study departs from Rathelot and Sillard (2009) in two important respects. First, we focus
on the creation of the rst wave of enterprise zones in 1997. This enables us to measure the
whole e¤ect of the enterprise zone creation rather than just an incremental e¤ect of the territorial
policy (an intensication of the incentives provided to employers with the passage of the second
to the third tier of urban interventions). Secondly, we focus on the e¤ect of the policy on local
unemployment rather than on local jobs (which may partly benet non-residents). To this end,
we use individual data on unemployment rather than rm data on employment.
4 The Data
We focus on the Paris region, which roughly corresponds to the Paris metropolitan area. With 10.9
million inhabitants, the region is subdivided into 1,300 municipalities including the 20 subdistricts
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of the city of Paris. These municipalities have very di¤erent population sizes that range from
225,000 residents in the most populous Parisian subdistrict to small villages located some 80 km
away from the city center (Source: 1999 Census of the Population).
We use the historical le of job applicants to the National Agency for Employment (Agence
Nationale pour lEmploi or ANPE hereafter) for the Paris region. The sample includes all unem-
ployment spells ending in the period running from July 1993 to June 2003. This interval includes
the implementation date of the enterprise zone program (January 1, 1997) and is broad enough to
study the e¤ect of enterprise zones not only in the short run, but also in the medium run. It is an
almost exhaustive dataset of unemployment spells in the region given that registration with the
national employment agency is a prerequisite for unemployed workers to be able to claim unem-
ployment benets in France. It contains information on the exact date of an application (the very
day), the unemployment duration in days, the reason for which the application came to an end,
the municipality where the individual resides, and a set of socio-economic characteristics reported
upon registration with the employment agency (age, gender, nationality, diploma, marital status,
number of children and disabilities).
We decided to focus on unemployment spells that began at most four years before July 1,
1993 (i.e. after July 1, 1989) and articially censored the few spells which lasted longer than four
years. This is because the assumptions underlying our duration model are unlikely to be satised
for very long spells. After eliminating the very few observations for which some socio-economic
characteristics are missing, we are able to reconstruct 8,831,456 unemployment spells ending in
the period between July 1, 1993 and June 30, 2003. These unemployment spells may end when the
unemployed nd a job, drop out of the labor force, leave unemployment for an unknown reason
or when the spell is right censored. Given the focus of the paper, we will mainly study exits that
end with nding a job, all other exits being treated as right-censoring in the analysis.
We rst graphically describe the evolution of the variables of interest over the period of ob-
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servation. We report in Figure 1 the unemployment rate in the region (from the Labour Force
Surveys) as well as the exit rate (to any destination) and the entry rate, both computed from
our data.9 As justied later on, the time frequency that we use is the semester, with semester 1
corresponding to the second semester of 1993.
[Insert F igure 1]
In the period running from the second semester of 1996 (semester 7) to the rst semester of 1999
(semester 12), there is no common trend for unemployment and exit rates since the unemployment
rate is rather at while the exit rate is decreasing. Interestingly, the entry rate into unemploy-
ment follows the same decreasing pattern. Stable unemployment in this period is thus concealing
decreasing entry and exit rates. The period from the second semester of 1999 (semester 13) until
the rst semester of 2001 (semester 16) exhibits a di¤erent pattern. Unemployment decreases
whereas both entry and exit rates increase. After the second semester of 2001 (semester 17), the
exit rate falls below the entry rate and unemployment increases.
To complete this description, Figure 2 reports the evolution of the di¤erent rates of exit from
unemployment by destination type, i.e. to a job, to non-employment or for unknown reasons. The
exit rate to non-employment is relatively constant. The exit rate to a job trends downwards around
the time the policy is implemented in the rst semester of 1997 (semester 8). Note also that the
rate of exits for unknown reasons slightly increases after the second semester of 1999 (semester
13). It suggests that some rules may have changed at that time in the way exits are recorded and
9The entry rate is the number of new unemployed workers within the semester divided by the number of
unemployed workers at risk at the beginning of the semester. Since there are strong seasonal elements regarding
the entry rate, we graphed a moving average of order 2 so as to smooth the curve and make the graph more
readable. The exit rate to a given destination is the number of unemployed workers experiencing a transition to
this destination within the semester divided by the number of unemployed workers at risk at the beginning of the
semester.
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in the empirical analysis below we will assess whether this change a¤ects the evaluation.
[Insert F igure 2]
Secondly, descriptive statistics on the number of unemployed workers at risk and the number
of exits to a job are reported by semester in Table 1 for the whole region (rst two columns). The
number of unemployed workers at risk is nearly constant from 1993 to 1999 and then decreases
before increasing again in 2001. This is consistent with a sharp decrease in the unemployment rate
after 1999 as was seen in the above graphs. The number of exits to a job does not follow exactly
the same pattern as the decrease occurs sooner, in 1996, as seen in Figure 2.
[Insert Table 1]
Over the whole period, the proportion of exits to a job decreases from 11:2% to 7:2%:
We also reported in Table 1 the same statistics for municipalities which size is in the 8,000-
100,000 range as we will restrict our working sample to that range in the policy evaluation section.
This range contains all treated municipalities and comprises approximately 300 municipalities out
of the 1,300 in the Paris region. There are no noticeable di¤erences between this restricted sample
and the full sample. Roughly speaking an average of 90,000 persons nd a job each semester and
this corresponds to about 300 exits per semester in each municipality. These gures explain why
we chose semesters as the time intervals in our analysis since using shorter periods would imply
too much variability due to the small sample size.
The raw data used in the evaluation of the EZ program are described by Figures 3 to 6. Figure
3 reports the evolution of the exit rates in the sample of treated municipalities and in three control
groups: a sample composed by non-treated municipalities between 8,000 and 100,000, and two
subsamples of that group made of municipalities located at a distance between 0 and 5 kilometers
of an EZ, or between 5 and 10 kilometers. For readability, we drew a vertical line at semester 8
(rst semester of 1997) when the policy started to be implemented. The curves for the control
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groups are broadly decreasing and exhibit parallel trends throughout the period. The curve for the
treatment group slightly diverges from the trends observed for the control municipalities between
semesters 1 and 12 (second semester of 1993 to rst semester of 1999). In particular, the exit
rate to a job remains at in the treatment group between semesters 7 and 8 (second semester of
1996 and rst semester of 1997) when the policy enters into e¤ect whereas it is decreasing in the
control groups. The estimation of the treatment parameter that we undertake in the remaining
sections of the paper is a way of formalizing and testing that these diverging trends are statistically
signicant.
None of these di¤erences seems to appear in graphs reporting the evolution of exit rates to non-
employment (Figure 4) and the evolution of exit rates for unknown reasons (Figure 5). In the latter
Figure, it is noticeable that exit rates for unknown reasons become larger in treated municipalities
the semester after the implementation of the treatment. However, our treatment parameter using
information on reported exits to a job would be underestimated only if a substantial fraction of
exits to a job are concealed among exits for unknown reasons. We attempt to estimate this e¤ect
later on and nd that the apparent increase is spurious (see Table 15). In Figure 5, it is also
noticeable that censorship due to exit rates for unknown reasons increased between semesters 12
and 14 (rst semester of 1999 and rst semester of 2000), which is consistent with our previous
remarks on Figure 2.
Lastly, Figure 6 represents the evolution of exit rates to a job, distinguishing between two
groups of municipalities depending on the share of their population residing in the enterprise zone.
The "attening" e¤ect between semester 7 (before treatment) and semester 8 (after treatment), as
already seen in Figure 3, is much more pronounced in municipalities in which the enterprise zone
host a larger fraction of the population. As a matter of fact, rates of exit to a job even increased
in those municipalities.
Turning to the composition of the sample before and after the beginning of policy implemen-
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tation, we report in Tables 2 and 3 some descriptive statistics at two dates before and after the
creation of enterprise zones (we chose the rst semester of 1994 and the rst semester of 2000,
which denes a period over which the exit rates are decreasing). These Tables show that the
sample averages are close at the two dates. There are some slight di¤erences in gender composi-
tion though as the proportion of females in the sample increases from 49:1% in 2000 to 52:2% in
1994. Interestingly, there are also relatively more foreigners in the sample of unemployed workers
in 2000 (26:9%) than in 1994 (22:5%). This pattern concerns all classes of foreign nationalities
except Europeans (other than French), i.e. North Africans, Sub-saharan Africans, and other na-
tionalities. We attribute these e¤ects to dynamic selection biases at the entry into and the exit
out of unemployment. The population at risk is increasingly made of subpopulations that have a
higher entry rate and a lower exit rate since exit rates to a job trended downwards between these
two periods. All in all, the average unemployment duration before nding a job increases from
235 days to 274 days.
[Insert Tables 2 and 3]
5 The econometric strategy
In theory, all unemployed workers can be a¤ected by the enterprise zone program although individ-
uals are more likely to be a¤ected if they reside in an enterprise zone because of the requirement
about local employment or if they live close to an enterprise zone because of spillover e¤ects
which can play in both directions (see our short survey of the literature above). Given that enter-
prise zones are clusters of a signicant size within or across municipalities, it would be desirable
to try and detect the e¤ect of the policy if any at the level of an enterprise zone. Nevertheless,
our data does not allow us to work at this ne level of disaggregation and our approach retains
municipalities as our spatial unit of analysis. Municipalities have on average twice the population
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of the EZ they contain. Any aggregate e¤ect at the municipality level will measure the e¤ect of
local job creation net of within-municipality transfers.
Our raw data consists of individual unemployment spells observed over time. In order to
measure the e¤ect of the EZ program, we start in a rst stage by estimating semester-specic
municipality e¤ects on the propensity to nd a job while netting out the e¤ects of observed in-
dividual characteristics (gender, age, nationality, diploma, family structure, disability) and the
economic conditions. These municipality e¤ects measure the chances of nding a job for unem-
ployed workers in each municipality during each semester, all things else being equal. In a second
stage, we then resort to various di¤erence in di¤erences approaches and compare the evolution
of these municipality e¤ects before and after the implementation of the policy between treated
municipalities and various control groups of other municipalities.
In a rst subsection, we explain how the coe¢ cients of individual variables used as controls are
estimated. In a second subsection, we explain how to recover the semester-specic municipality
e¤ects. Finally, in a third subsection, we turn to the estimation of our parameter of interest:
the e¤ect of enterprise zone designation on the exit rate from unemployment to a job at the
municipality level.
5.1 Estimating the e¤ects of individual variables
Consider an individual i who enters unemployment at a given entry date t0i, which is the realization
of a random variable denoted T0i. The unemployment spell of that individual ends when a job is
found or when it is right-censored. Right-censoring groups all other exit types: end of the panel,
dropping out of the labor force or disappearance from the records for an unknown cause.
Denote Ti the latent date at which the individual nds a job and ti its realization. The corre-
sponding latent duration is Di = Ti   T0i, with realization di. Also denote Tci the latent date of
right-censoring and Dci = Tci   T0i the duration until right-censoring. The observed duration of
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the unemployment spell is then min(Di; Dci). We assume that the latent duration until nding a
job and the latent duration ending with right censoring are independent.
For an individual i, we denote 

d
 eXi; j (i) ; t0i the hazard rate for exiting to a job at duration d
where eXi is a set of non-time varying individual explanatory variables, and j (i) is the municipality
in which the individual resides. Note that the hazard rate is written as a function of the entry
date t0i for the sake of exibility.
With these denitions in mind, we can now consider a duration model where observations are
clustered by municipality and semester. The time interval between July 1, 1993 and June 30, 2003
is split into S semesters denoted [ q;  q+1). For q = 1; :::; 20. From now on, we will refer to semester
q to designate [ q;  q+1). Denote s =
20X
q=1
q:1 f q  t0i + d <  q+1g the semester during which the
unemployed worker i exits after an unemployment spell of duration d (ie. t0i+d 2 [ s;  s+1)). The




 eXi; j (i) ; t0i = j(i) (d; s) exp (Xis) (1)
where j (d; s) is the baseline hazard rate in municipality j during semester s, and Xi =
h eXi; Aii









can be decomposed into parameters corresponding to the individual variableseXi (denoted  eXs ) and parameters corresponding to the indicators of months and years of entry
(denoted As ). The hazard rate is assumed to depend on both semesters and municipalities to take
into account the possibility that local policies and local economic conditions may vary over time.
We follow Gobillon, Magnac and Selod (2010) who extend the set-up proposed by Ridder and
Tunali (1999) of Stratied Partial Likelihood Estimation (SPLE) which itself is a generalization of
Cox Partial Likelihood. To start with, we estimate the e¤ects of individual explanatory variables
allowing for xed cluster e¤ects (i.e. semester-specic municipality e¤ects in our case). Denote

j (d; s) the set of individuals at risk in municipality j during semester s for a duration d, i.e.
the set of all individual unemployment spells which reach at least duration d during semester s.
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The risk set of an individual i who resides in municipality j(i) and whose unemployment spell
lasts a duration di until an exit to a job occurs during semester si, is given by <i = 
j(i) (di; si).
An unemployed worker ` is in the risk set <i under three conditions. The unemployed worker `
should be a resident of municipality j (i); the observed duration of the unemployment spell should
be larger than di; the unemployed worker should have been unemployed at least for a duration
di at some date during semester si. Formally, these three conditions can be written: j (`) = j (i),
min (d`; dc`) > di and t0` + di 2 [ si ;  si+1) where t0` is the date of entry and tc` is the date of
right-censoring for individual `.
It is useful to go through a simple example to understand the logic of this construction. Figure
7 explains how unemployment spells are considered in each semester. Two unemployment spells
are represented and cover three semesters. The rst spell begins during semester 2 and lasts e1
units of time till the end of this semester. The spell reaches the end of semester 3 after a total
duration of e1+ d1, and continues afterwards. The second spell begins during semester 1 and lasts
e2 till the end of this semester. It ends in semester 2 after a complete duration of e2 + d2. The
subsamples of individuals at risk during the rst three semesters and that we described above are
respectively f2g, f1; 2g and f1g. The set of durations during which there is at least one individual
at risk during semester 1 is the interval [0; e2]. For semester 2, the set is [0; e1][ [e2; e2 + d2] (where
in our example e1 < e2), and for semester 3, the set is the interval [e1; e1 + d1].
Coming back to the thread of our formal discussion, we now derive the Cox partial likelihood
function from the following conditional probability. Individual i nds a job after an unemployment
spell of duration di during semester si, conditionally on the event that someone in individual is
risk set <i nds a job at duration di during semester si, with the probability given by:










Observe that since the risk set is dened for each semester and municipality, the baseline hazard
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disappears from this conditional likelihood function. This baseline hazard can thus depend in
a exible way on semester-specic municipality e¤ects. It is in this sense that this method of
estimation is stratied.








where Ls (s) = 
ijsi=s
Pi is the partial likelihood function of all individuals experiencing an exit
during semester s. Note that a given likelihood function Ls contains terms relative to some indi-
viduals at risk during semester s who do not experience an exit but contribute to the denominator
of (2). In contrast, some individuals at risk during semester s may not be used at all to compute
the likelihood Ls. For instance, denote ds0 the smallest duration at which an individual experi-
ences an exit during semester s in a given municipality. If some individuals are at risk in the
same municipality during semester s only for durations shorter than ds0, then they are not used
to compute Ls. Finally, note that an individual may contribute to several Ls as he may be at risk
at some dates in several semesters.
In practice, it is computationally intractable to maximize the full partial likelihood function L when
both the sample and the number of semesters are large. As our application has N = 8; 831; 456
observations and S = 20 periods, we perform the estimation on subsamples. We maximize each
term Ls with respect to s on an adequate subsample which contains all the information and
is constructed in the following way. Denote 
js the subset of individuals at risk in municipality






s contains all the individuals necessary to compute the partial likelihood functions Ls.
Maximizing each Ls separately requires that the coe¢ cients of individual variables in equation (1)
are left free to depend on the semester. This was assumed from the start although had we wished,
we could have imposed the identity of these coe¢ cients across semesters using minimum distance
estimation in a second step. This would have enabled us to obtain coe¢ cients which are constant
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across semesters. We prefer to use the more exible estimates so that the policy evaluation is
robust to varying e¤ects of individual characteristics over the business cycle.
5.2 Estimating municipality e¤ects
Given the estimation of coe¢ cients s we can now recover the baseline hazard functions in each
municipality and for each semester. Dene the integrated baseline hazard function in a munic-
ipality j for semester s as js (d) =
dZ
0
j (u; s) du. We construct the Breslows estimator of this
function as:
bjs (d) = dZ
0
I (Cjs (u) > 0)P
i2
js(u)












s (u) is the subset of individuals at risk in municipality j during




js (u)), I () is the indicator function,
Cjs (u) = card 

j
s (u), and dN
j
s (u) is a dummy that equals one if someone in municipality j
experiences an exit during semester s in an arbitrarily short period of time before date u (and
zero otherwise). Moreover, the variance of bjs (d) for each d can be recovered from the formulas
given in Ridder and Tunali (1999). Its implementation is also detailed in Gobillon, Magnac and
Selod (2010).
Note that we choose not to include the estimates of the J 0s coe¢ cients (the coe¢ cient of the
dummies for months and years of entry) in the computation of the denominator of (4). We do so
because the estimates of these coe¢ cients pick up a mixture of the calendar time e¤ects at entry
and exit and are not unbiased estimators of the true entry e¤ects. More generally, this stems from
the non-identication of duration and entry e¤ects when no functional form is assumed.
Equation (4) yields an estimate of the integrated baseline hazard function for each municipality and
semester. We could presumably work with various summaries of these functions, for instance the
integrated hazards at 6 months, 12 months, etc., describing the facility with which the unemployed
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nd a job in a given municipality. We prefer to summarize the semester-specic municipality e¤ects
using a multiplicative specication. The hazard function in a municipality j during semester s takes
the form:
j (d; s) = js (d) (5)
where js is a semester-specic municipality e¤ect and  (d) is a general baseline hazard function.
To estimate the semester-specic municipality e¤ects, we break down unemployment duration into
M intervals [dm; dm+1), m = 1; :::;M 1 with d1 = 0 and dM = +1. In our application, the length
of each interval is 90 days except the last one which is unbounded on the right. We denote m the
interval [dm; dm+1) and m = 1dm+1 dm
dm+1R
dm
 (u) du the average baseline hazard rate over interval














Cjs (u) > 0

du
the time in interval m during which some individuals are at risk in municipality j during semester
s. An estimator of the quantity given in (6) when some people are at risk (js;m > 0) can be
constructed from equation (4). It is given by: y^js;m =
1
js;m
[bjs (dm+1)   bjs (dm)]. Using equation
(5), we can set up the estimation of this model as a minimum distance procedure by writing that
ln y^js;m = ln
j
s + ln m + "
j
s;m (7)
where "js;m = ln
 
y^js;m
  ln  yjs;m are the residuals describing the sampling variability of estimated
hazard rates. The covariance matrix of these residuals can be recovered from the covariance matrix
of the estimated integrated hazards given by (4).
Nevertheless, we estimate equation (7) by weighted least squares using a simple system of weights
instead of using optimal minimum distance. The poor small sample properties of optimal mini-
mum distance estimation are well known (see for instance Altonji and Segal, 1996, and follow-ups).
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Other weighting schemes are possible and we tested in Gobillon, Magnac and Selod (2010), al-
though with a much more restrictive set of data, the robustness of our results to these alternative
weights. Our simple weights are given by the number of unemployed workers at risk at the be-
ginning of each duration interval m. Note that this number may not include all individuals of a
given municipality that contributed to the partial likelihood Ls over the interval. Indeed, some
unemployed workers of the municipality may be at risk at semester s inside an interval but not
at the beginning of that interval. Finally, we can derive the covariance matrix of the estimator of
js from the covariance matrix of semester-specic municipality integrated hazards as explained
by Ridder and Tunali (1999).
5.3 Evaluation of the e¤ect of enterprise zones
We can now nally turn to the evaluation of the e¤ect of enterprise zone designation on the
municipality e¤ects js estimated above for each municipality j and semester s. These municipality
e¤ects describe the facility with which the unemployed nd a job in municipality j at semester
s. We distinguish semesters before the creation of enterprise zones that we generically denote s0
(i.e. between the second semester of 1993 and the second semester of 1996) and semesters after
the creation of EZs that we generically denote s1 (i.e. between the rst semester of 1997 and the
rst semester of 2003). We adopt the vocabulary of treatment e¤ects when referring to enterprise
zone designation (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). Denote lnjs1 (1) the (logarithm of) municipality
e¤ect in the case in which municipality j is treated. It is the observed or estimated e¤ect in the
case the municipality comprises an enterprise zone in semester s1 and the counterfactual if the
municipality does not host an enterprise zone in semester s1. Similarly, the municipality e¤ect
is denoted lnjs1 (0) when municipality j does not contain an enterprise zone in semester s1. It
is the counterfactual when municipality j does in fact contain an enterprise zone in semester s1.
Now, denote Zj the treatment indicator, a dummy variable that indicates whether municipality
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j actually comprises an enterprise zone from 1997 onwards. The observed municipality e¤ect in
semester s1 can thus be written as:
lnjs1 = Z
j: lnjs1 (1) +
 
1  Zj lnjs1 (0) :
The average e¤ect of enterprise zone designation on unemployment exits in municipalities which
include enterprise zones after 1997 i.e. the treatment on the treated is given by:
 = E

lnjs1 (1)  lnjs1 (0)
Zj = 1 :
This cannot be observed since the term E

lnjs1 (0) jZj = 1

in this expression is a counterfactual.
Assume nevertheless that the change in the municipality e¤ects over time would have been the




Zj = 1 = E  lnj (0) Zj = 0 ; (8)
where we denote lnj (z) = lnjs1 (z) lnjs0 with z 2 f0; 1g. The e¤ect of creating an enterprise
zone can now be rewritten as:
 = E









Zj = 1  E  lnj (0) Zj = 0 ; (9)
where the denitions of rst di¤erences were used to obtain the rst line, and where assumption
(8) was used to obtain the third line.
The rst right-hand side term in (9) can be estimated from the data on treated municipalities






where !j is a weight and
[lnjs is an estimator of the semester-specic municipality e¤ect (which is
estimated in the previous stage). In practice, the weight can be constructed using the share of un-
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employed workers living in a treated municipality j or using the covariance matrix of municipality
e¤ects obtained in previous stages.
Similarly, the second right-hand side term in (9) can be recovered likewise from the data on
untreated municipalities:







An estimator of the e¤ect of enterprise zone designation is then given by:
b = bE  lnj (1) Zj = 1  bE  lnj (0) Zj = 0 (10)
In practice, as we will see below, b is the estimated coe¢ cient of the treatment indicator in a
regression weighted by !j of semester-specic municipality e¤ects on dummies for municipalities,
dummies for time intervals, and the treatment indicator.
Interestingly, estimates can be obtained using versatile denitions of the control group. When
dening the control group however, there is a potential conict between two objectives. First,
we aim at retaining municipalities that are similar to those in the treatment group along various
dimensions. This suggests that the control group should comprise municipalities that are clos-
est in the space of characteristics, including the location within the Paris region (i.e. neighbor
municipalities). Observe that since political actors had a say in the designation of enterprise
zones, the selection process was not completely based on the ranking according to the aggregate
indicator. This makes it easier to nd control municipalities with characteristics similar to those
that are treated. Nonetheless, avoiding contamination of the e¤ects through spatial spillovers is
a second objective and this may contradict the rst objective (Blundell, Costa-Dias, Meghir and
van Reenen, 2006). This is why it makes sense to develop various empirical strategies controlling
for various municipality variables and various ways of constructing the control group.
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6 Results of the policy evaluation
To start with, we briey report the results of the estimation of the stratied Cox model which
allows us to estimate spatial e¤ects free of "composition e¤ects" due to individual observed char-
acteristics. We then turn to the evaluation of the creation of enterprise zones on January 1st
1997. We begin with dening the treatment parameter and with reporting the estimation of
the propensity score at the municipality level. We then present estimates obtained by matching,
within and rst di¤erence estimation. We nally report our preferred specication and provide
various robustness checks.
6.1 Stratied partial likelihood estimates
We performed the rst-stage estimation of the model as given by the partial likelihood (3) for
all semesters between the second semester of 1993 and the rst semester of 2003. In Table 4,
we report only the results of this estimation for the rst semester of 1994 and the rst semester
of 2000. In our policy evaluation, this rst-stage is used to purge semester-specic municipality
rates of exit to a job from individual composition e¤ects and to control for right-censorship in
durations. The e¤ects of socio-demographic characteristics are very similar to those that were
obtained in Gobillon, Magnac and Selod (2010) where we used a single ow sample instead of
semester specic samples. We refer the reader to this paper for a full analysis of these e¤ects
although a brief summary is useful. Unemployed workers who are disabled, who are females or
who have many children, less often experience an exit to a job. Those living in a couple exit
to a job more often and as expected low educated unemployed workers exit to a job less often
than educated ones. Furthermore, Sub-Saharan Africans and North Africans nd a job far less
often than French people. Noticeably, the situation deteriorated between 1994 and 2000 for low
educated people and Sub-Saharan Africans. This conrms that rates of exit to a job decreased
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over this period, specically for the sub-populations who experience a low exit rate.
[Insert Table 4]
6.2 Denition of the treatment
We estimate the e¤ect of the EZ program using various dates before and after the creation of EZs.
In the setting of Section 5.3, the period s0 now corresponds to all semesters between the second
semester of 1993 and the second semester of 1996 (semester 7 on the Figures) and s1 corresponds
to all semesters between the rst semester of 1997 (semester 8) and the rst semester of 2003.
The treatment group is composed of municipalities which comprise an enterprise zone. In
robustness checks we shall also test our results against departures from this construction and will
distinguish municipalities for which enterprise zones represent a large section of their population
(more than 50%) from the other treated municipalities. We will also modify the treatment group
by including neighbors of treated municipalities.
The main substantive issue concerns the control group which in principle could contain all
municipalities which are not in the treatment group. However, this implicitly assumes that all
non-treated municipalities resemble treated municipalities, which is far from being the case. Some
municipalities are too far from the treated municipalities both geographically or in the space of
other characteristics. Most prominently, the population size of a municipality has a very di¤erent
support in the primary treatment and control groups. While the control group comprises many
small and very small municipalities (less than 1,000 inhabitants), the smaller population size of
a treated municipality is 17,500. We thus chose from the start to restrict the control group to
municipalities whose population size is between 8,000 and 100,000.10 Note that it changes the
10The reason for excluding the municipalities over 100,000 inhabitants is that this group includes Paris inner
districts and one close neighbor, Boulogne-Billancourt, which are at no risk of being selected because of their
a­ uence. We chose the lower bound of 8,000 because we wanted to include neighbors of treated municipalities.
We do not know the identity of unsuccessful applicants to the program.
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denition of the treatment parameter which now refers to municipalities with this population size.
Further restrictions on the control group will further modify the denition of the "e¤ect of
a treatment" and will be brought in after the construction of the propensity score that we now
detail.
6.3 Describing the treated municipalities: the propensity score
We now analyze the municipality characteristics that determine the creation of an enterprise zone
and that will allow us to construct the propensity score as proposed by Rosenbaum and Rubin
(1983) so as to control for selection on observables. We estimate a discrete model, here Probit, to
explain the status of being designated, z = 1 against z = 0 where we use some municipality control
variables X among which are measures of physical job accessibility, the municipal composition of
the population in terms of nationality or education, the rate of unemployment, the proportion of
young adults, and the scal potential. We also include in the specication the smallest distance
to another municipality comprising an enterprise zone. This is to account for the possible will
of authorities to spread enterprise zones more or less evenly throughout the region.11 Results
of weighted Probit estimations where the weights are the (square root of the) population size of
unemployed workers in the municipality are reported in Table 5. The results of our benchmark and
preferred specication appear in the rst column although some less parsimonious specications
were also estimated (see the notes below this Table).
[Insert Table 5]
In conformity with the selection criteria, the larger the scal income in the municipality or the
smaller the proportion of persons without a high school diploma in the municipality, the less likely
the municipality comprises an enterprise zone although the latter e¤ect is hardly signicant. The
11We checked endogeneity issues by experimenting with the second-lowest distance as an instrument. It hardly
a¤ected results.
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higher the rate of individuals below 25 or the larger the size of the population, the larger the
probability that the municipality contains an enterprise zone. In terms of distance, the larger
the distance to a designated municipality or the larger the density of jobs attainable in less
than 60 minutes by private vehicle, the less likely it is that the municipality will be endowed
with an enterprise zone. This is consistent with the targeting of places with relatively lower
job accessibility. Also, since designated areas are clustered around Paris, they all have another
designated area as a close neighbor, explaining the negative sign on the distance to the nearest
EZ (although not signicant). In line with Hanson (2009), we also experimented with political
variables which are the frequency of votes for political parties. Even if municipalities whose
townhalls were administered by politicians belonging to the governing party at the time of EZ
designation are more likely to be picked up, the e¤ect is not signicant and we chose not to include
these variables in the nal specication.
In the two other columns of Table 5, we experimented two alternatives. We rst included a vari-
able equal to the average of municipality e¤ects a¤ecting exit rates to a job in the semesters before
the implementation of the policy (as estimated in the rst step by Stratied Partial Likelihood).
We chose the average of these e¤ects because the average was the most signicant predictor of the
propensity score. The e¤ect is positive although it is at the limit of signicance. This means that
the municipalities including a designated area seem to be more advantaged in term of easiness
for exiting unemployment than the other municipalities sharing the same local characteristics.
This is a standard result in the evaluation literature where governments often intervene to "pick
winners" (Boarnet and Bogart, 1996). We also ran the Probit regression using no weights and
though standard errors are larger, the e¤ect of variables remains qualitatively the same. We will
test later for the robustness of our complete results to these changes in specication.
Using the results in column 1, we predict the propensity score for each municipality. It inter-
estingly reveals that the supports of the predicted propensity scores in the treated and control
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groups di¤er quite markedly as shown in Table 6.
[Insert Table 6]
The smallest predicted probability in the treatment group is equal to 0.1%. We therefore further
restrict the control group to municipalities whose predicted propensity scores are larger than the
value 0.05% (see Table 6). It is roughly two times smaller than the unrestricted control group
and includes 135 municipalities (instead of 258), which is equal to about ten times the number
of treated municipalities (13). We will later test the robustness of our results to more or less
restrictive selections.
6.4 Matching, within and rst-di¤erences
We chose to estimate linear models of treatment e¤ects given that the number of treated mu-
nicipalities is quite small (13) with respect to the number of controls (135). As explained in the
econometric section and following Imbens and Wooldridge (2009), we started from the following
baseline regression :
[lnjs = Zjs +Xj + s + j + ujs (11)
where s is the semester, j a municipality and ujs is an error term (including the sampling error
on the left-hand side variable due to rst-stage estimation). Parameters s denote time dummies
(for semesters) and j is a municipality e¤ect. Variable Zjs is the dummy for treatment status, Xj
are control variables which do not vary across time in our database.
Using an orthogonality argument of Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), we have:
E(ujs j Zjs ; Xj) = 0 =) E(ujs j Zjs ; Xj; p(Xj)) = E(ujs j Zjs ; p(Xj)) = 0; (12)
Hence, we can replace from now on the explanatory variables by the propensity score p(Xj)
although we experimented with general specications.
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The regression set-up (11) delivers the parameter of interest, , which is equal to the average
treatment on the treated. A natural weight to use is the number of unemployed workers in the
municipality at the beginning of each semester. We shall also check the robustness of the results
using alternative weights such as the inverse of the estimated standard error of the estimate[lnjs:
An important aspect of the specication is the inclusion of a full set of time-constant munic-
ipality e¤ects, j, in regression (11). Nevertheless, we can start from a more parsimonious form
where we only include the indicator variable that a municipality comprises a designated enterprise
zone, so that j = D:1fj is designatedg. This restriction grants more identication power when
estimating  in equation (11) at the cost of reinforcing the restrictiveness of the orthogonality
condition described by equation (12). We shall see that this restrictive condition is rejected by the
data and that a full set of municipality e¤ects is needed.
We rst run a basic regression without any controls whose results are reported in Table 7,
column (1). The e¤ect of the dummy for including a designated area, D, is negative and signicant
which conrms that in a treated municipality, the unemployed are receiving and accepting a job
with a lower probability. Our parameter of interest, the treatment parameter, is estimated to be
negative but insignicantly di¤erent from zero. It does not seem to be an issue stemming from
large standard errors since the order of magnitude of the standard error is approximately the same
as for the previous designation e¤ect.
[Insert Table 7]
To go further, we introduce the propensity score as it was estimated in Table 5 column (1)
and Table 7 column (2) reports the results. Firstly, the coe¢ cient of the predicted propensity
score is strongly signicant and negative. Potentially treated municipalities have a signicantly
lower exit rate to employment. Secondly, note that the sign of the coe¢ cient of a designated
municipality e¤ect, D, changes in comparison with column (1): it is now positive and very
signicant. Enterprise zones were created in municipalities where the chances of nding a job
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are signicantly larger when holding constant the characteristics that explain the treatment i.e.
through the propensity score. It conrms the e¤ect of picking winnersthat we identied from
the results on the propensity score in Table 5. In contrast, controlling for the propensity score
does not a¤ect the estimate of . It remains insignicantly di¤erent from zero at the 10% level
and a large standard error is not responsible for the lack of impact. We also experimented with a
more exible specication for the propensity score using splines without any substantial e¤ect as
reported in column (3) of Table 7. Finally, we obtain the same results when we use the subsample
of larger predicted propensity scores only, municipalities being selected if they are above the 10th
percentile of the propensity score in the treatment group.
Our next step is to present results when we include unrestricted municipality e¤ects, j. There
are two common ways to proceed and they should yield the same results if the econometric model
is correctly specied. They consist in the use of within estimation or rst-di¤erences to eliminate
the municipality e¤ects (see for instance Blundell and Costa-Dias, 2009). These estimates are
reported in Table 8 where the rst column repeats the matching results from Table 7, the second
column reports results of the within estimation using robust-to-heteroskedasticity standard errors
and the last column reports results in rst di¤erences using robust-to-heteroskedasticity standard
errors.12
Di¤erences across estimation methods are striking as can be seen on Table 7. While the
estimated coe¢ cient for the treatment indicator in within estimation remains negative at about
the same level as the matching estimate, this estimate is signicant at the 10% level. In sheer
contrast, the estimate of the treatment parameter using rst di¤erences is positive (0.049) and
signicant at the 1% level. However, these estimators should converge to the same value. Our
econometric model in which the treatment parameter is constant over time is thus rejected by the
12None of the standard errors are corrected for autocorrelation because this will be done in the next section in




Given our long period of observation, we can plausibly argue that the assumptions underlying
di¤erence-in-di¤erences are not valid and that medium-term trends are di¤erent in treated and
control municipalities. This is why we perform the same analysis by matching, within and rst-
di¤erences although we now allow the treatment parameters to vary period by period after the
treatment. Table 9 reports such results and shows that indeed the e¤ect of the treatment seems to
have a negative trend using all methods of estimation. The short-run treatment e¤ects as estimated
by matching and within estimation are now positive although insignicant in the semester after
treatment. They are either positive or negative but still insignicant after the implementation of
the treatment. After semester 14, that is after the rst semester of 2000, the e¤ects estimated by
matching and within estimation are all negative and some of them are signicant.
[Insert Table 9]
In contrast, most e¤ects using rst di¤erences are positive and larger in the short run than in
the medium term (at least until semester 16) and conrm results obtained in Table 8. Estimated
treatment e¤ects are consistently in the range 0.025-0.059 for periods before semester 14 although
only two of these estimates are signicant.13 In contrast, estimates become smaller or negative
after semester 14 but grow again after semester 17. There are therefore two reasons to think
that our global evaluation relies too much on the medium run evaluation after semester 14. From
Figures 1 and 2, we know that unemployment started trending upward at around semester 14 and
that, more importantly, the exit rate from unemployment attributable to unknown exits changed
signicantly from period 13 onwards. This is why we now restrict our analysis to periods 1 to 12,
between the second semester of 1993 and the rst semester of 1999, a period in which the exit
rate to a job decreases, the unemployment rate is stable or decreases moderately and the rate of
13Correcting for autocorrelation a¤ects standard errors (see below).
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exits for unknown reasons is stable. We do not take a stand on whether the treatment e¤ects
would disappear after three years or whether the implicit underlying assumption of the di¤erence-
in-di¤erences method about common period e¤ects between treated and control municipalities
would be wrong.
6.5 Our preferred specication
Table 10 reports results of rst di¤erence estimation correcting for within-municipality autocor-
relation by FGLS using an unrestricted covariance matrix between semester-specic municipality
shocks over time. We present results that we obtain when varying the range of semesters used in
the estimations.14
[Insert Table 10]
The rst column reports the results of our preferred specication since this specication is robust
to various changes in the underlying construction and seems to be a conservative estimate. The
estimated treatment parameter is equal to .031 and is signicant at the 5% level. This e¤ect is
quite small since it implies that the rate of exit to a job increased by a meagre 3% when the policy
was implemented. Given that there are roughly 300 exits each semester in an average municipality
in the considered range of population size, the policy amounts to generating about 10 new exits
per semester only.
We included as an explanatory variable the propensity score to control for any residual un-
observed municipality heterogeneity.15 It amounts to considering that municipalities could have
heterogeneous trends in their exit rates, something which might be more likely in a period in
which exit rates to a job have a strong downward trend (between the second semester of 1993 and
the rst semester of 2000, see Figure 2). These trends are supposed to be random conditional
14We do not report the estimated semester e¤ects. They reproduce closely the raw trends as graphed in Figure
2.
15We did not correct for the generated regressor issue that such an inclusion implies.
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on observables (Heckman and Hotz, 1989) so that a much less restrictive orthogonality condition
than equation (12) holds, namely:
E(ujs   ujs 1 j Zjs ; p(Xj)) = 0:
This assumption was exploited by Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997) and this approach belongs
to matching di¤erence-in-di¤erences methods as described by Blundell and Costa-Dias (2009). We
use it in a linear regression setting because our samples are small.
In the second column we further restrict the period of evaluation, keeping only two semesters
before the reform and two semesters after the reform. The estimate remains signicant and stands
at .042. If we further restrict to the period at which the reform was implemented, the estimate is
equal to .035 although it becomes insignicant. The treatment variable is very much correlated
with the propensity score and when we omit the latter, the estimate increases to .058 and is
signicant at the 1% level, which corresponds to a signicant doubling of the e¤ect. It might
however reect that some rms delayed hiring during the last semester of 1996 in order to benet
from the policy in the following semester although we do not nd evidence of such opportunism
below.
Interestingly, we can distinguish between treated municipalities according to the proportion
of the municipality population which resides within the enterprise zone. Specically, we included
in our preferred specication an indicator that the proportion of the population living in the
enterprise zone in the treated municipality is below 50%. The result is striking since the treatment
parameter estimate is now equal to .057 instead of .031 and is signicant at a 1% level while the
treatment e¤ect in municipalities where a small proportion of the population lives in an enterprise
zone is also positive (.016=.057-.041) but becomes insignicant. The dilution of the e¤ect will
be conrmed below when changing the treatment denition. It points out that the e¤ect of the
policy is very localized.
38
6.6 Spillover e¤ects
We now investigate the possibility of spatial spillovers on neighboring municipalities. In theory,
spatial spillovers for neighboring areas can either be positive (if workers in neighboring areas
benet from the expansion of the activity in the EZ) or negative (if jobs are relocated away from
neighboring areas, or if some substitution of non-EZ jobs with EZ jobs occur). A positive
externality on non-EZ areas may occur if the policy adversely leads to the stigmatization of EZ
residents, with employers discriminating against EZ residents and becoming more likely to hire
workers residing outside the EZ.
To assess these e¤ects, we began with changing the composition of the control group. We
selected municipalities in the control group depending on their distance to a treated municipal-
ity. We experimented with three distance thresholds at 5, 10 and 15 kilometers where these
distances are taken between municipality centres. We rst restricted the previous control group
to municipalities whose center is farther than 5 kilometers of the center of a treated municipality
(respectively 10 and 15 kilometers). Second, we restricted the control group to municipalities
whose center is within 5 kilometers of the center of a treated municipality (respectively 10 and
15). Table 11 reports these results.
[Insert Table 11]
The evidence of spillover e¤ects to neighboring municipalities is weak. In all but one of these
experiments, the estimates of the treatment parameter remains around .03 although with some
degree of variation in the signicance of the estimates. The only case in which the estimate becomes
hardly distinguishable from zero is when the control group is restricted to municipalities outside
the 15 km range of a treated municipality. In our opinion, the assumption that these municipalities
are a¤ected by the same period e¤ects as the treated municipalities becomes unsustainable since
these municipalities correspond to distant zones where the labor market conditions are likely to
be di¤erent.
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We also attempted to change the denition of the treatment, and the composition of the
treatment and control groups. Instead of retaining the municipalities comprising an enterprise
zone only, we also retained their neighbors at a distance of less than 2 kilometers (respectively at
a distance of less than 3 kilometers). The number of potentially treated municipalities increases
from 13 to 24 treated municipalities (respectively 51). Table 12 reports these results. It is striking
that in both cases the estimated treatment parameter is no longer signicantly di¤erent from zero.
It conrms that the creation of an enterprise zone has a very localized e¤ect on the unemployment
exit rate to a job as was already seen in Table 10. It has no signicant spillover e¤ects on
neighboring municipalities.
[Insert Table 12]
6.7 Other robustness checks
We also performed other robustness checks of these results. First, we modied the whole procedure
so as to include the past average of municipality e¤ects in the propensity score. Second, we varied
the municipality-and-semester specic weights that we used in the estimation. Instead of using
the (square root of the) number of unemployed workers in the municipality at the beginning of
the semester, we used the (inverse) standard errors of the estimates of the left-hand side variable
as provided by the rst-stage estimates or no weights at all. Table 13 presents these results which
are hardly di¤erent from those obtained for the main specication and if anything, estimates of
the treatment parameter are becoming larger.
[Insert Table 13]
Moreover, the construction of the semester-specic municipality e¤ects purges exit rates to jobs
from individual characteristics although it does a poorer job at controlling for entry e¤ects be-
cause of identication issues. We included year and month dummies in the rst stage estimation
notwithstanding that identication of these parameters from baseline duration hazard could be
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fragile. This is why we re-estimated our preferred specication controlling for semester and mu-
nicipality specic entry rates. Results are presented in the rst two columns of Table 14. In the
rst column (respectively the second column), we control for the log-entry rate in the current
period (resp. the lagged log-entry rate). Although this variable has a signicant and positive
(resp. negative and not signicant) e¤ect, the estimate of the treatment e¤ect is hardly a¤ected
and remains equal to approximately .03.
[Insert Table 14]
Lastly, to measure placebo e¤ects, as suggested by Manning and Pischke (2006) we also included in
the specication an indicator for the lagged treatment e¤ect. If the policy is anticipated, however,
a negative e¤ect could be observed if employers delay hiring decisions. The lagged treatment
e¤ect is found not to be signicantly di¤erent from zero and not to a¤ect the estimated treatment
parameter.
6.8 Policy evaluation of related outcomes
We also performed the same evaluation using as dependent variable the raw entry rates into
unemployment as in Papke (1994) and the three raw exit rates from unemployment that we can
construct from our data. Recall indeed that an exit can have three di¤erent destinations: a job,
non-employment or an unknown reason.
We check whether the results with raw rates are comparable with those obtained by applying
our more sophisticated method that purges exit rates to a job from individual characteristics and
takes into account the usual censorships that a¤ect unemployment data. This is a useful check
to perform since policy analysts often resort to raw rates to perform policy evaluations. Table 15
reports these results.
[Insert Table 15]
In column 1, the parameter which measures the e¤ect of the treatment on the log-entry rates in
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unemployment is not signicantly di¤erent from zero. Column 2 reports the e¤ect of the treatment
on the log-exit rates out of unemployment to a job. It is signicantly positive and equal to .040.
It is thus slightly larger than the estimate that we obtain using our two step procedure to purge
exit rates from composition e¤ects (in terms of observed individual characteristics) although the
di¤erence is insignicant. The di¤erence may come either from composition e¤ects or from right-
censored unemployment spells. In the somewhat restricted sense that the conclusion applies to
this specic dataset, it suggests that the estimates using raw data could in fact be reasonable
approximations.
Evidence gathered in Tables 14 and 15 runs against an argument advanced by Elverly (2009)
about indirect e¤ects of employment zones. The local labour market in treated municipalities
would become more attractive after the creation of an enterprise zone and non-employed persons
would be encouraged to search for a job. This would increase the entry rate into unemployment and
the competition for jobs among the unemployed. We neither nd that the treatment parameter is
a¤ected by entry rates (Table 14) nor that entry rates change because of the program (Table 15).
The estimates of the treatment parameter for exits to non-employment and exits for unknown
reasons are not signicantly di¤erent from zero although the estimate for exits to non-employment
is quite large at the same level .039. Contrary to the stylized facts in the descriptive section above,
the censorship due to exits for unknown reasons does not seem to be a¤ected by the policy. Our
estimated parameter is thus robust to the consideration that some exits for unknown reasons
might be exits to a job triggered by the EZ policy.
7 Conclusion and policy discussion
In this paper, we have evaluated the e¤ects of enterprise zones in the Paris region on exit rates
from unemployment to employment at the municipality level.
Our main results are threefold. Firstly, in line with several studies on enterprise zones, we
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showed that zone designation tended to favor municipalities with favorable unobserved charac-
teristics. This is not surprising given that policy makers usually tend to select places that are
more likely to carry success or choose places that gather prior favorable conditions for economic
development. Secondly, we found that the French EZ program had a small positive impact, which
is consistent with previous work on the number of local establishments in enterprise zones (Rath-
elot and Sillard, 2009). The policy had a short-run impact on the ease with which the local
unemployed workers move out of unemployment. This result is robust to a variety of specications
and robustness checks and is broadly in line with the previous works in the US that found that
enterprise zones had a small impact on employment (Papke, 1994, Lynch and Zax, 2008, Neumark
and Kolko, 2010) and contrasts with those which found that it had no impact on employment
(Boarnet and Bogart, 1996, Bondonio and Engberg, 2000). Lastly, we nd that the e¤ect is very
localized and seems to be the direct consequence that tax rebates are given in exchange of the
requirement that some locals should be hired.
The estimated e¤ect of the policy on unemployment is small and represents a 3% increase in
the rate of exit from unemployment to jobs. This is in contrast with the gure of a 30% increase in
the number of jobs in the treated EZ reported by Gilli (2006) for the same period. This suggests
that the substitution of jobs from non-EZ to EZ areas may indeed have been quite large but may
have had an overall e¤ect on employment that was almost neutral. It is also likely that the policy
may have tended to stimulate exits from non-employment which we are not able to measure with
our data. Finally, external e¤ects on non-economic outcomes may also have been triggered by the
EZ policy. We leave these issues for future research.
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the exhaustive sample, by semester
All municipalities Municipalities whose population is
between 8,000 and 100,000 in 1990
Year Semester Nb. at risk Exit to job Nb. at risk Exit to job
1993 2 1,139,991 127,748 795,570 89,404
1994 1 1,144,764 144,094 799,234 100,743
1994 2 1,201,196 140,438 837,624 98,051
1995 1 1,153,306 140,389 802,327 98,364
1995 2 1,168,106 135,768 813,158 94,885
1996 1 1,131,391 139,655 790,664 97,521
1996 2 1,171,410 123,759 818,334 86,350
1997 1 1,111,631 124,091 778,704 86,490
1997 2 1,140,782 111,852 800,008 77,843
1998 1 1,090,633 114,619 768,067 79,910
1998 2 1,122,653 102,765 791,357 71,850
1999 1 1,085,102 105,976 765,103 73,381
1999 2 1,101,209 100,188 776,471 70,061
2000 1 1,026,096 103,761 723,854 72,330
2000 2 970,200 95,736 687,451 67,035
2001 1 905,301 86,233 640,140 60,183
2001 2 936,464 76,388 661,347 53,769
2002 1 960,918 77,619 678,313 54,336
2002 2 1,061,983 79,513 747,329 55,657
2003 1 1,074,594 77,036 755,211 53,521
Nb. at risk: number of unemployed workers whose unemployment spell began within the four-year period before
the beginning of the semester and who are at risk at least one day during the semester.
Exit to job: number of unemployed workers exiting to a job during the period.
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of the sample at risk in the first semester of 1994
Variable N.Obs. Mean Std
Exit types and unemployment spells
Exit to job in the period 1,144,762 0.126 0.476
Exit to non-employment in the period 1,144,762 0.058 0.373
Unknown exit in the period 1,144,762 0.196 0.551
Duration if exit to job in the period 144,092 234.810 560.812
Duration if exit to non-employment in the period 66,196 275.532 733.689
Duration if unknown exit in the period 224,829 207.517 584.673
Characteristics of unemployed workers
Age 1,144,762 33.010 9.394
Male 1,144,762 0.522 0.500
Female 1,144,762 0.478 0.500
Single 1,144,762 0.563 0.496
Couple 1,144,762 0.437 0.496
No child 1,144,762 0.580 0.494
1 child 1,144,762 0.173 0.379
2 children 1,144,762 0.138 0.345
3 children 1,144,762 0.061 0.240
4 children 1,144,762 0.024 0.153
5 children and more 1,144,762 0.023 0.149
French 1,144,762 0.775 0.417
European (other) 1,144,762 0.065 0.247
North African 1,144,762 0.080 0.272
Subsaharan African 1,144,762 0.046 0.210
Other Nationality 1,144,762 0.033 0.178
College diploma 1,144,762 0.217 0.412
High School (final year and diploma) 1,144,762 0.148 0.355
High school (excluding final year) and technical diploma 1,144,762 0.318 0.466
Secondary school and no diploma 1,144,762 0.317 0.465
Disabled 1,144,762 0.028 0.164
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of the sample at risk in the first semester of 2000
Variable N.Obs. Mean Std
Exit types and unemployment spells
Exit to job in the period 1,026,093 0.101 0.424
Exit to non-employment in the period 1,026,093 0.058 0.361
Unknown exit in the period 1,026,093 0.253 0.563
Duration if exit to job in the period 103,758 274.313 548.811
Duration if exit to non-employment in the period 59,776 327.977 689.502
Duration if unknown exit in the period 259,276 263.671 545.119
Characteristics of unemployed workers
Age 1,026,093 34.620 9.567
Male 1,026,093 0.491 0.500
Female 1,026,093 0.509 0.500
Single 1,026,093 0.562 0.496
Couple 1,026,093 0.438 0.496
No child 1,026,093 0.613 0.487
1 child 1,026,093 0.155 0.362
2 children 1,026,093 0.124 0.329
3 children 1,026,093 0.063 0.243
4 children 1,026,093 0.025 0.156
5 children and more 1,026,093 0.020 0.141
French 1,026,093 0.731 0.444
European (other) 1,026,093 0.064 0.245
North African 1,026,093 0.093 0.290
Subsaharan African 1,026,093 0.068 0.252
Other Nationality 1,026,093 0.044 0.206
College diploma 1,026,093 0.244 0.430
High School (final year and diploma) 1,026,093 0.173 0.379
High school (excluding final year) and technical diploma 1,026,093 0.290 0.454
Secondary school and no diploma 1,026,093 0.293 0.455
Disabled 1,026,093 0.045 0.208
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Table 4: Results of the first-stage estimation, semester 1 in years 1994 and 2000
1st semester 1994 1st semester 2000
Age/100 -4.153*** -1.670***
(0.251) (0.282)








No child <ref> <ref>
1 child -0.111*** -0.085***
(0.009) (0.010)
2 children -0.096*** -0.003
(0.010) (0.011)
3 children -0.171*** -0.075***
(0.014) (0.016)
4 children -0.175*** -0.100***
(0.023) (0.026)





North African -0.402*** -0.383***
(0.013) (0.014)
Subsaharan African -0.723*** -0.752***
(0.019) (0.019)
Other Nationality -0.536*** -0.719***
(0.021) (0.023)
College diploma <ref> <ref>
High School (final year and diploma) -0.234*** -0.292***
(0.008) (0.009)
High school (excluding final year) and technical diploma -0.320*** -0.338***
(0.007) (0.008)
Secondary school and no diploma -0.583*** -0.629***
(0.009) (0.010)
Not disabled <ref> <ref>
Disabled -0.371*** -0.381***
(0.021) (0.019)
Number of individuals at risk 1144762 1026093
Number of exits within the interval 144092 103758
Mean log-likelihood -6.281 -6.028
Note: ***: significant at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level; *: significant at 10% level.
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Table 5: Propensity score: the effect of municipality characteristics
on the designation of an enterprise zone
Weights Weights, inclusion of No weights
past municipality effect
Job density, 60’ by private vehicle -3.999* -3.357 -4.171*
(2.109) (2.260) (2.298)
Proportion of no diploma 37.779* 33.447 24.029
(22.249) (23.998) (22.865)
Proportion of technical diplomas 20.998 5.860 0.974
(28.215) (31.527) (28.900)
Proportion of college diplomas 38.978 27.180 17.299
(29.889) (32.809) (31.336)
Distance to the nearest EZ -0.027 -0.033 -0.035
(0.024) (0.025) (0.024)
Proportion of individuals below 25 in 1990 17.125*** 14.890*** 11.834**
(5.156) (5.320) (5.256)
Population in 1990 0.021** 0.022** 0.019*
(0.009) (0.009) (0.011)
Average net income in 96 -4.975*** -5.140*** -2.033
(1.563) (1.636) (1.593)
Past municipality effect in exit to job 4.014*
(2.323)
Constant -32.115 -1.447 -16.526
(21.818) (29.243) (22.537)
Nb. observations 271 271 271
Pseudo-R2 .542 .561 .477
Note: ***: significant at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level; *: significant at 10% level.
The sample is restricted to municipalities with a population between 8,000 and 100,000 in 1990. The first and
second columns are weighted by the square root of the number of unemployed workers at risk at the beginning
of period 8, and the third column is not weighted. Past municipality effect refers to the average of municipality
effects in previous semesters, as estimated in the 1st stage (SPLE).
We also used alternative specifications including in the set of explanatory variables, for instance: the job density
within a 60’ radius by public transport, the unemployment rate in 1990, the proportions of Europeans (French
excluded), North Africans, Subsaharan Africans and other nationalities. The estimated coefficients were not
significant and a Chi-square test did not reject the absence of joint significance. Consequently, we dropped these
variables from the specification.
Table 6: Descriptive statistics on the propensity score in treated and control groups
Group Nb. obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Non-treated 258 .034 .093 0 .643
Non-treated, propensity score > .0005 135 .065 .121 0 .643
Treated 13 .497 .352 .001 .995
Note: The observation unit is a municipality between 8,000 and 100,000 inhabitants. The propensity score was
computed from the results of Table 5, column (1).
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Table 7: The effect of designation and treatment on semester-specific municipality effects (OLS)
No control Propensity score Propensity score Propensity score
support : z > zmin support : z > zmin support : z > zmin support : z > z10
Score in splines
Municipality -.035** .074*** .043** .070***
designated for an EZ (.017) (.019) (.017) (.020)
EZ treatment effect -.024 -.023 -.021 -.030
(.022) (.021) (.019) (.023)
Propensity score -.229*** -.154***
(.018) (.020)
P. score, spline 1 -3.42***
(.41)
P. score, spline 2 -.394***
(.131)
P. score, spline 3 .863***
(.132)
P. score, spline 4 -1.008***
(.114)
P. score, spline 5 -.099
(.069)
Nb observations 2960 2960 2960 2960
R2 .510 .534 .571 .512
Note: ***: significant at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level; *: significant at 10% level.
Weight: number of unemployed workers at risk. Year dummies are included and are not reported here. The
standard errors are computed using the sandwich formula and the generated regressor issue due to the estimated
propensity score is not corrected. zmin: minimum of the score for the treated municipalities divided by two.
z10: first decile of the score for treated municipalities. Value of the bounds for splines determined so that treated
municipalities are allocated equally in categories.
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Table 8: The effect of designation and treatment on semester-specific municipality effects:
Matching, within and first-difference
Matching Within estimator First-difference
Municipality .074***
designated for an EZ (.019)




Weight nut nut nut−1 + nut
Nb observations 2960 2960 2812
Note: ***: significant at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level; *: significant at 10% level.
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity. nut: number of unemployed workers at risk at period t. Year
dummies are included and are not reported here.
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Table 9: The effect of designation and treatment on semester-specific municipality effects
treatment effect varying with time
Matching Within estimator First-difference
Municipality 0.074***
designated for an EZ (0.019)
Propensity score -0.229*** -0.009
(0.018) (0.006)
Treatment effect, 0.010 0.011 0.043**
semester 8 (0.046) (0.022) (0.022)
Treatment effect, -0.006 -0.005 0.039
semester 9 (0.043) (0.022) (0.026)
Treatment effect, 0.025 0.022 0.059*
semester 10 (0.052) (0.028) (0.031)
Treatment effect, -0.016 -0.020 0.027
semester 11 (0.043) (0.019) (0.036)
Treatment effect, -0.011 -0.015 0.030
semester 12 (0.054) (0.026) (0.040)
Treatment effect, -0.026 -0.029 0.025
semester 13 (0.055) (0.025) (0.044)
Treatment effect, 0.011 0.007 0.054
semester 14 (0.055) (0.021) (0.048)
Treatment effect, -0.062 -0.063** -0.015
semester 15 (0.060) (0.028) (0.052)
Treatment effect, -0.023 -0.027 0.024
semester 16 (0.053) (0.031) (0.056)
Treatment effect, -0.060 -0.062** 0.005
semester 17 (0.052) (0.028) (0.060)
Treatment effect, -0.032 -0.033 0.053
semester 18 (0.054) (0.026) (0.064)
Treatment effect, -0.045 -0.044 0.038
semester 19 (0.049) (0.033) (0.068)
Treatment effect, -0.069 -0.067* 0.019
semester 20 (0.057) (0.035) (0.071)
Constant -6.861*** -0.016** -0.125***
(0.019) (0.007) (0.009)
Weight nut nut nut−1 + nut
Nb observations 2960 2960 2812
R2 .535
Note: ***: significant at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level; *: significant at 10% level.
nut: number of unemployed workers at risk at period t. Year dummies are included and are not reported here.
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity.
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Table 10: The effect of designation and treatment on semester-specific municipality effects
robustness to changes of semesters,
specific effect for EZ with a small proportion of the population in the municipality
Periods: Periods: Period: Period: Specific effect for
less than 13 5 to 9 8 8 small-proportion EZ
EZ treatment effect .031** .042** .035 .058*** .057***
(.014) (.019) (.025) (.019) (.016)
EZ treatment effect -.041**
X small-proportion EZ (.018)
Propensity score -.008* -.021* .049 -.007*
(.004) (.012) (.039) (.004)
Nb observations 1628 592 148 148 1628
Note: ***: significant at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level; *: significant at 10% level.
Year dummies are included and are not reported here. Small-proportion EZ are the EZ whose population accounts
for less than 50% of the population of the municipalities where the EZ is located. Estimation method: FGLS

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 12: The effect of designation and treatment on semester-specific municipality effects,
robustness to changes in the specification of the treatment group
Treatment group: Treatment group: Treatment group:
municipalities with municipalities less municipalities less
an EZ than 2km of an EZ than 3km of an EZ
EZ treatment effect .031** .010 .009
(.014) (.012) (.010)
Propensity score -.008* -.003 -.001
(.004) (004) (.004)
Nb observations 1628 1947 1881
Note: ***: significant at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level; *: significant at 10% level.
Year dummies are included and are not reported here. We only keep semesters between 1 and 12. Estimation
method: FGLS with a constant within-municipality unrestricted covariance matrix. ”Municipalities with an EZ”
corresponds to our baseline treatment group and includes 13 municipalities. There are 24 municipalities within
2km of an EZ and 51 municipalities within 3km of an EZ.
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Table 13: The effect of designation and treatment on semester-specific municipality effects,
robustness to changes in the specification of the propensity score and weighting scheme
Propensity score: Weighting: Weighting:
inclusion of average inverse of the no weights
of past municipality 1st stage
effects standard errors
EZ treatment effect .032** .029** .042***
(.014) (.014) (.016)
Propensity score -.008** -.048 -.013***
(.004) (.030) (.005)
Nb observations 1518 1617 1276
Note: ***: significant at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level; *: significant at 10% level.
Year dummies are included and are not reported here. We only keep semesters between 1 and 12. Estimation
method: FGLS with a constant within-municipality unrestricted covariance matrix. The results of the propensity
score equation when including the average of past municipality effects is given in Table 1, column 2.
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Table 14: The effect of treatment on semester-specific municipality effects,
robustness to the inclusion of the present and past log-entry rates,
and the inclusion of a lagged treatment effect
Inclusion of the Inclusion of the Inclusion of a
log-entry rate in t log-entry rate in t-1 lagged treatment effect
EZ treatment effect .030** .034*** .036**
(.013) (.015) (.014)
Lagged treatment effect -.012
(.015)
Log-entry rate .111*** -.051
(.027) (.032)
Propensity score -.008* -.011** -.008*
(.004) (.005) (.004)
Nb observations 1628 1480 1628
Note: ***: significant at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level; *: significant at 10% level.
Year dummies are included and are not reported here. We only keep semesters between 1 and 12. Estimation
method: FGLS with a constant within-municipality unrestricted covariance matrix. The entry rate is defined as
the ratio between the number of entries during the semester and the number of unemployed workers at risk at
the beginning of the semester.
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Table 15: The effect of treatment on the logarithm of entry and exit rates
Entry rate Exit rate Exit rate Exit rate
into unemployment to job to non-employment to unknown
EZ treatment effect .011 .040*** .039 .013
(.021) (.015) (.024) (.014)
Propensity score -.077*** -.009*** -.007* .001
(.018) (.003) (.004) (.004)
Nb observations 1628 1628 1628 1628
Note: ***: significant at 1% level; **: significant at 5% level; *: significant at 10% level.
Year dummies are included and are not reported here. We only keep semesters between 1 and 12. Estimation
method: FGLS with a constant within-municipality unrestricted covariance matrix. The entry (resp. exit) rate is
defined as the ratio between the number of entries (resp. exits) during the semester and the number of unemployed
workers at risk at the beginning of the semester.
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Figure 1: Unemployment rate, entry rate into unemployment and exit rate from unemployment
















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19
Semester
Unemployment rate (left axis) Exit rate (right axis)
Entry rate (right axis)
Note: Semester 1 refers to the second semester of 1993. For the entry rate, we represent the average of the current
semester and the following semester to smooth the curve and avoid seasonality effects.









Note: Semester 1 refers to the second semester of 1993.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Semester
Non−EZ, 8,000−100,000 Enterprise Zones
Non−EZ, 0−5 km Non−EZ, 5−10 km
Note: Semester 1 refers to the second semester of 1993. Non-EZ: municipalities which do not include an EZ.
8,000-100,000: population between 8,000 and 100,000 in 1990. 0-Xkm: between 0 and Xkm of a municipality
including an EZ. Enterprise zones: municipalities which include an EZ.


























1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Semester
Non−EZ, 8,000−100,000 Enterprise Zones
Non−EZ, 0−5 km Non−EZ, 5−10 km
Note: Semester 1 refers to the second semester of 1993. Non-EZ: municipalities which do not include an EZ.
8,000-100,000: population between 8,000 and 100,000 in 1990. 0-Xkm: between 0 and Xkm of a municipality
including an EZ. Enterprise zones: municipalities which include an EZ.
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Semester
Non−EZ, 8,000−100,000 Enterprise Zones
Non−EZ, 0−5 km Non−EZ, 5−10 km
Note: Semester 1 refers to the second semester of 1993. Non-EZ: municipalities which do not include an EZ.
8,000-100,000: population between 8,000 and 100,000 in 1990. 0-Xkm: between 0 and Xkm of a municipality
including an EZ. Enterprise zones: municipalities which include an EZ.




















1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
Semester
high−proportion EZ low−proportion EZ
non−EZ, pop. 8,000−100,000
Note: Semester 1 refers to the second semester of 1993. High-proportion EZ (resp. low-proportion EZ): munici-
palities including an EZ which accounts for more (resp. less) than 50% of the population of those municipalities in
1990. Non-EZ: municipalities which do not include an EZ. 8,000-100,000: population between 8,000 and 100,000
in 1990.
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Figure 7: Semester-specific risk sets
e2 d2
e1
Semester 1 Semester 3Semester 2 Time
Unemployment spell 1
Unemployment spell 2
d1
65
